Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year

Faculty Publications

1-1-1999

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175
Eric J. Segall
Georgia State University College of Law, esegall@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of
the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Eric J. Segall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, 16 Const. Comm. 569 (1999).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

5 U.S. (1 CRANCH) 137, 175
EricJ. Segall*
What an assignment! Select one moment from constitutional history, extinguish it from memory, and then describe all
the consequences, desirable and not, that flow from the destruction of that legal moment. Talk about legal indeterminacy. Of
course, Dred Scott would be high on my list, but that's too easy.
There is a constitutional evil, however, that if eliminated would
probably have led to a different result in Dred Scott and in many
other questionable cases as well. Although I can identify that
evil, isolating its specific cause is a more difficult task. I will,
therefore, work backwards, first describing the problem and then
discussing the legal moment that made it possible.
For most of its history, the Supreme Court has exercised
what I will call strong judicial review. The Court has invalidated
actions of the political branches and the states even in the absence of clear textual or historical support. Whether one agrees
or disagrees that the Constitution prohibits prayer in school, affirmative action, campaign finance reform, hate speech regulations, undue interference with a woman's right to have an abortion, political patronage, the legislative veto, and federal
commandeering of state governments (to name just a few modern examples), it is virtually impossible to argue that these decisions were based on unambiguous constitutional text or generally accepted historical accounts. Rather, these cases, like most
of the Court's constitutional law cases, are based primarily on
prior Supreme Court doctrine and the personal judgments or
values of the Justices.
This strong or active model of judicial review can be contrasted with a weak one, under which judges would refuse to
strike down a political decision absent an "irreconcilable vari* Professor of Law, Georgia State College of the Law. I would like to thank a
pair of Michaels (Paulsen and Klarman) for their comments on an earlier draft. In addition, I owe great appreciation to most of my colleagues at Georgia State who have had to
listen to my ravings about strong judicial review for approximately eight years.
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ance" between that action and clear constitutional text or tradition.' A good faith application of the "irreconcilable variance"
standard by judges would result in a deferential system of judicial review similar to the "rational basis" model the Court has
used for ordinary economic legislation for the last sixty years.
The justification for deferential judicial review in a constitutional democracy is easy to articulate. The people agree to fundamental principles limiting future governments and assign the
enforcement of those principles to independent political officials
such as judges. Under this system, the judges act as agents for
the drafters of the fundamental principles. Although there may
be "dead hand" objections to such a system, there are also easily
identifiable benefits, such as the strong sense of national unity
that emerges from intergenerational agreement over shared values and political procedures.
This agency theory of judicial review, however, does not
even remotely describe our current system.2 As already noted,
for almost two hundred years the Court has consistently invalidated the political decisions of other governmental units, even
where the relevant constitutional text was vague, the applicable
history indeterminate, and therefore the agency theory of judicial review unavailable. The justification for this kind of political system is much more difficult to articulate, especially when
judges have life tenure and cannot be removed from office when
they fall out of step with the people they are supposed to serve.
Would anyone favor calling a new constitutional convention
to identify fundamental norms and invite only lawyers and
judges? Of course not. But when judges are free to create new
constitutional principles and limitations out of hopelessly vague
aspirations such as "due process," "equal protection," and "freedom of speech," don't we end up in a similar place? The ultimate resolution (except for the difficult constitutional amendment process) of many social, economic, and political issues, is in
the hands of judges who do not operate under any clear burden
of proof, who are working with indeterminate text and history,
and who often approach these issues with a less than deferential
perspective on other political institutions. This is not a good po1. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), in E.H. Scott, ed., The Federalist
and Other ConstitutionalPapers424, 426-28 (Albert Scott & Co., 1894). See also James
B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7

Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
2.

See Michael J.Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?,93 Nw. U,

L. Rev. 145,147 (1998).
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litical system unless you are a lawyer (or even better a law professor, and best of all, a federal judge).
This strong system of judicial review has also removed many
important social and political issues from meaningful public debate and placed them in an adversarial process which more often
than not fails to address the most important factors in the debate. I can't say it any better than Michael McConnell:
The Court's [constitutional law cases are] ... typically long on

manipulation of precedent and low on intelligible principle.

Nor... has there been much more moral deliberation behind
the curtains. The Justices are far too busy to spend much
time thinking about the cases, and their conferences are
largely perfunctory.... In contrast to the months, even years,
that are devoted to major legislative deliberation, the Justices
devote one hour to oral argument and somewhat less than
that to discussion at conference ....

The appearance of de-

bate and deliberation created by the opinions is largely a
sham ....
...

[N]ot only do Supreme Court opinions contain little seri-

ous moral reflection, but they serve as an excuse for dispensing with moral reflection at other levels of government. Supporters of a right to abortion do not have to engage in a
serious discussion of their position in
3 the state legislatures...
all they need do is cite Roe v. Wade.
Our current system of strong judicial review has also led,
not surprisingly, to the imposition of fundamental principles favored by the class of people who usually serve on the Supreme
Court-upper middle-class, well-educated lawyers.4 More often
than not, and contrary to what most liberal academics believe,
these principles are usually quite conservative. The Supreme
Court has a long history of favoring the rich and the powerful
over the poor and the downtrodden and has often tried to block
important change. Among many examples, the Court has delayed or prevented legislative efforts to alleviate slavery, to improve unjust working conditions with minimum wage laws and
maximum hour regulations, to impose a progressive income tax,
to eradicate child labor, to decrease job place inequalities due to
racial discrimination, to draw legislative districts to include more
3. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politicsin TransformingMoral
Convictions into Law, 98 Yale W. 1501,1537 (1989).
4. Id. at 1537-38. See also Klarman, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 189 (cited in note 2).
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minority representation, and to devise campaign finance reform.
And, for those who think that the conservative Court died away
with the New Deal, the last three of those sets of cases were decided in the past thirty years.
Some people, of course, favor many of the results discussed
above and instead would lament the Court's decisions which
have furthered more liberal causes. Although these cases have
been few and far between, the Court's decisions on racial segregation, abortion, prayer in school, and occasionally free speech
have been looked at with favor by the left and have angered the
right. Nevertheless, forty-five years after Brown, school segregation remains a major problem in most areas of the country;
twenty-six years after Roe, poor women still face serious obstacles when trying to secure safe timely abortions; and the clear
trend in First Amendment doctrine for the last thirty years has
been to protect the speech of big corporations, wealthy politicians, and racists. The point is that when the Court tries to force
progressive change on an unwilling populace, it is usually unsuccessful and often results in a conservative backlash.5
Whether one sits on the left or the right, however, the fol-,
lowing is clear: our system of strong judicial review places lawyers, judges, and the adversarial process in which they operate at
the forefront of many of the most difficult and controversial social and political issues of our day. Because I don't think this
system adequately resolves those questions, the butterfly I would
like to stomp is strong judicial review-judicial review not limited to extremely clear violations of constitutional text or tradition.
Is there one specific moment in time to which we can attribute the Court's decision to exercise strong judicial review?
Probably not. Government officials tend to assert as much power
as they can. Nevertheless, consider what might have happened
had John Marshall taken a different turn in Marbury. When
considering whether Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutionally conferred original jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court in mandamus cases, what if Marshall had said something
along the following lines:
The applicant argues that jurisdiction is proper because Congress may add to the Court's original jurisdiction. The consti5.

See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to

the FirstAmendment, 1990 Duke LJ. 375,383-85.
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tutional text does not support this construction but neither
does it absolutely foreclose it. Because this Court's sole
province is to inquire whether there is an irreconcilable variance between an act of the legislature and the Constitution,
and because all doubts must be resolved in favor of the challenged legislation, the Court has no choice but to agree with
the appellant and find that Congress may add to the Court's
original jurisdiction. In reaching this decision, we must be
mindful that the legislature has just as much responsibility to
consider the constitutional validity of its actions as does this

Court and that, absent clear inconsistency, this Court's function is not to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.6

John Marshall's views on federalism expressed in McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden, as well as his description of "arising under" jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, have largely survived the test of time. Had Marshall really applied the limited type of judicial review he talked
about in dicta in Marbury7 it is possible that a much more deferential system of judicial review would have emerged. If so,
then perhaps we would have a culture in which the Congress and
the President take seriously their oaths to uphold the Constitution because the Court is rarely there as a backstop; a culture in
which the people take most of the responsibility for living up to
our vague foundational values while the Court ensures that clear
violations of the Constitution are redressed; and a culture in
which those with a progressive vision do not waste their energies
trying to persuade nine elite lawyers to see the world their way
but instead focus on the people and their elected lawmakers to
try and convince them that strong action is needed to remedy society's most fundamental problems. It is past time that we realize that "[j]udicial decisions have the ability to sap the strength
of political movements while lacking the ability to ensure much
in the way of meaningful social change."9 That being the lesson
of two hundred years of strong judicial review, it is time to re6. To the extent that John Marshall was concerned that Jefferson would not obey
a decision in favor of William Marbury, there were of course many ways for Marshall to
avoid that result. For example, he could have ruled that delivery was necessary to complete the commission or that Marbury's rights expired when the new Administration

came into office.
7. See Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,179 (1803).
8.

See generally Robin West, The AspirationalConstitution,88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 241,

267 (1993).
9.

See Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial

Review, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975,976-77 (1993).
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consider whether Alexander Hamilton had it right. Judges
should only reverse the judgment of other political institutions if
there is an irreconcilable variance between that decision and the
Constitution. In all other cases, let the people decide.

